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The author charges opposing systems with 'Creationism.' This he explains to mean making the efficient cause central, whereas he makes the final cause central (p. 393). But his conception of efficient cause seems to be narrowly restricted to the conception of mechanical causation, while, in spite of his Hegelian antecedents (see p. 63 n. and p. 67 n.), he never gets beyond the equally narrow conception of final cause as an attracting ideal. When, therefore, he makes this the sole causal relation of mind to mind, he is naturally unable to explain, *e. g.*, the peculiar impression made by his own ideas on an unsympathetic critic. But seriously, is there not such a thing as an immanent final cause of a whole, or the principle of a whole determining its parts? In monistic idealistic systems God is conceived as this principle, as the 'ground' as well as the 'goal' of finite minds and of Nature, each mind containing and expressing the principle, being self-conscious and self-determining, indeed, but not in an absolute sense, because no mind except God is completely self-conscious, *i. e.*, possesses the complete consciousness of itself, or is completely self-determining, because there is no complete self actually there to determine. This view of monism the author never really attacks.

As a final criticism, mention should be made of the disfiguring solecisms which occasionally mar the text and add to the irritation of a reader who does not see why a claim to be a philosopher should exempt one from writing good English. Such, *e. g.*, are 'sourcefulness,' in the sense of being the source of (p. 309), 'enwholing self' (p. 298), 'universal greatening' (p. 255) and 'to reluctate' (p. 77).

But in spite of disagreement one may feel grateful to Professor Howison for giving us so much to think about. It is to be hoped that he may fulfill the promise of a more systematic exposition of his ideas, in which event much that now appears doubtful or obscure will probably appear both clear and illuminating.

H. N. GARDINER.

SMITH COLLEGE.

Zur Experimentellen Kritik der Theorie der Aufmerksamkeitschwankungen. BERTIL HAMMER. *Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane.* Bd. 37, Hft. 5. Pp. 363–367.

The article is strongly suggestive of the famous chapter on snakes in the volume on the fauna of Iceland. In the first place, the author argues that whatever the causes of the phenomena in question may be, they have nothing to do with attention or we could not record them. He then attempts experimentally to reduce the fluctuations of slight visual stimuli to adaptation, a purely retinal process, and ascribes auditory oscillations to changes in the source of sound.

His experiments on sight follow Pace very closely. The stimulus was given by the boundary between rectangles of paper photographically prepared to give very slight differences of brightness. A dot on the dividing line was fixated and a record made of one appearance and reappearance. His results show that the times were longer with greater differences, that they usually became shorter during a series of experiments and that negative after-images could be registered while resting the eyes between experiments.

On the basis of these results the author insists that the vanishing in all so-called attention fluctuations is due to adaptation and the recovery to slight eye movements. This conclusion seems doubtful for several reasons. (1) As the author rather savagely points out, in most other experiments the fixation is by no means accurate and the disappearances come in spite of slight movements. (2) Even in fixation intended to be constant, as in the present investigation, it is not likely that the eye was motionless for the eight to thirty seconds during which the experiment lasted, as McAllister has recently pointed out that the eye is seldom at rest for one ninth of a second continuously. At least it would be most unlikely that it should be absolutely at rest for so long a period as twenty seconds and then move unconsciously at the end of that time. (3) The appearance of negative after-images between the series of experiments does not necessarily indicate that the process of adaptation had continued until the retina is no longer capable of reacting, as we constantly find these images appearing when we could still clearly see the color that induced them. His experiments seem then to be far from proving either that his conditions and those under which his so-called attention would arise are identical, or even that adaptation and eye-movement will explain his own observations.

This leaping at conclusions is still more evident in his investigation on the fluctuation of auditory impressions. The author found that he seemed to get the variations in the ticking of a watch at first, but soon noticed that the maxima coincided with a certain position of the balance wheel. He tried listening to several watches and even a chronometer and found that the ticking of all seemed to have fluctuations (apparently the ear was the only criterion). He concludes that all watches are alike in this respect and all earlier results are erroneous. He then prepared an electro-magnetic sounder, which he assumes gives constant intensities, and discovered no fluctuations. There was no attempt to obtain an objective measure of the intensity of the ticks of the watch and even if we are convinced of the correctness of his statement for one instrument it does not follow that all have the same peculiarity. The second apparatus is no more likely to give constant tone than the one used by Dr. Dunlap, and a man predisposed to a negative answer would hardly be likely to have the patience to search out the comparatively narrow range of tone intensities within which fluctuations occur.

While any investigation which points out unnoticed possible sources of error in older works should be welcome, it is nevertheless hazardous to announce negative results in a field so much worked over on the basis of a few hours' experiments.

W. B. PILLSBURY.

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN.